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Employing the VAR to estimate the Bank of Korea’s reaction 
function, we find that the call rate reacts positively to a shock to the 
inflation gap, the output gap, the exchange rate gap, the stock price gap, 
and the lagged call rate during some of the quarters.  In explaining the 
variance of the call rate, the inflation gap and the exchange rate gap are 
more influential in the short run whereas the output gap and the stock 
market gap are more important in the long run. 
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The objectives of the Bank of Korea (BOK) are to pursue price and 
financial stability for a sustainable economic growth.  During the Asian 
financial crisis, monetary policy was pursued to achieve the above mentioned 
goals.  During 1997.M7 – 1998.M1, the Korean won plunged by 91% as the 
exchange rate rose from a low of 890.50 won per U.S. dollar to a high of 
1,701.53.  Partly due to the depreciation, the inflation rate rose 6.32% 
during the same period.  The industrial production index dropped 15.6% 
from a high of 118.21 in 1997.M10 to a low of 99.82 in 1998.M7.  Real 
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GDP at the 1995 value declined 21% from 115,952 billion won in 1997.Q4 to 
91,580.7 billion won in 1998.Q1.  Unemployment rates rose from a very 
low level of 2.1% in 1997.M10 to a high of 7.6% in 1998.M7.  Industrial 
share prices dropped 49% from 83.09 in 1997.M6 to a low of 42.38 in 
1997.M12.  Faced with a recession, rising inflation, currency depreciation, 
and poor stock market performance, the Bank of Korea kept the discount rate 
at 5.0% but raised the call rate from 11.19% in 1997.M6 to a high of 25.63% 
in 1998.M1.  To further defend the won and mitigate the inflationary 
pressure, seasonally adjusted M1 was reduced from 34,495 billion in 
1997.M11 to 31,764.4 billion in 1997.M12 and 28,118.2 billion in 1998.M6.  
Several comments on the Bank of Korea’s monetary policy during the Asian 
financial crisis can be made.  The Bank of Korea changed the call rate more 
often than the discount rate.  Due to the lags in information and recognition, 
the Bank of Korea implemented monetary policy with a lag.  Monetary 
policy was employed to resolve several macroeconomic variables, which 
may be in conflict with one another.  For example, real GDP in Korea 
declined during 1997.Q4 – 1998.Q1, but the call rate went up from 16.44% 
to 23.93% during the same period.  During the turbulent times of the Asian 
financial crisis, the Bank of Korea raised the call rate to defend the won and 
address the concern of rising inflation.  On the other hand, the recession 
would require the Bank of Korea to lower the call rate.    
This paper studies the Bank of Korea’s monetary policy reaction function.  
Extending the simple Taylor rule (1993, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), the 
paper considers three additional variables, namely, the exchange rate, stock 
market performance, and the lagged call rate.  The inclusion of the 
exchange rate variable is consistent with the Bank of Korea’s objectives of 
maintaining price and financial stability because a substantial depreciation of 
the won would cause domestic price and wage inflation and capital outflows.  
We follow Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Rigobon and Sack (2003) that 
stock prices may enter into the reaction function as another variable.  The 
paper also considers two exogenous variables, namely, the federal funds rate 
and a dummy variable for the Asian financial crisis.  Hence, this paper 
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extends Hsing’s (2004) study, which does not consider stock prices and the 
two exogenous variables in examining the Bank of Canada’s policy function.  
The VAR model is applied in empirical work in order to take into 
consideration potential simultaneous relationships among endogenous 
variables.  In the impulse response function and the variance decomposition, 
we will present the possible response of monetary policy to a shock to each 
of the endogenous variables and the percent of the variance that can be 
attributable to each of the individual endogenous variables.  The Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filter is employed to estimate potential output and trend 
values for other selected variables. 
 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
Several major articles related to the monetary policy reaction function and 
the Taylor rule are surveyed and summarized.  Judd and Rudebusch (1998) 
found that the performance of a Taylor-rule type function varies during the 
periods of Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan and suggested that the Taylor rule 
framework is useful in summarizing major variables of monetary policy.  In 
comparison, they indicated that the Taylor rule yields less standard deviation 
during the Greenspan period than the Volcker period and cannot converge 
during the Burns period mainly because monetary policy under Burns was 
less responsive to inflation and more sensitive to business cycles.  Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (1998) estimated the reaction functions for the G3 (U.S., 
Japan, and Germany) and E3 (U.K., France, and Italy) countries.  According 
to their findings, central banks in the G3 countries pursued inflation targeting 
implicitly, were forward-looking, and reacted to the expected inflation 
instead of the past inflation.  On the other hand, central banks in the E3 
countries relied too much on the German monetary policy and kept interest 
rates higher than the domestic economic conditions required.  They 
suggested that targeting inflation may be better than fixing the exchange rate.  
David Romer (2001) made several comments on the Taylor rule.  Relatively 
large values of the coefficients for the inflation and output gaps would cause 
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the actual inflation rate and output to decline faster than expected.  It would 
be proper to use the lagged inflation gap and the output gap.  To deal with 
an open economy, the exchange rate may need to be considered.  The 
lagged federal funds rate should be considered to capture partial adjustment.  
The output gap may vary due to different estimates for potential output. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) stressed the role of asset prices in monetary 
policy mainly because it would affect the balance sheet and the cost of 
borrowing.  They empirically tested the model using the U.S. and Japan as 
samples.  They criticized Japan’s monetary policy in dealing with asset 
prices and inflation during the 1980s and 1990s and found that the Fed 
reacted preemptively to inflation and did not respond to asset prices 
independently.  They suggested that a central bank should react to asset 
prices only if rising asset prices would raise inflation expectations.  Rigobon 
and Sack (2003) showed that monetary policy responds significantly to stock 
market performance in that there is a 50% probability that the Fed would 
reduce the federal funds rate by 25 base points if the S&P index drops by 5%.  
However, Bullard and Schaling (2002) showed that including asset prices in 
the Taylor rule would result in an indeterminate equilibrium and more 
unpredictable volatility and suggested that asset prices should not be included 
in Fed’s reaction function. 
Hsing (2004) studied the Bank of Canada’s reaction function and found 
that the extended Taylor rule including the exchange rate applies to Canada 
because one of the objectives of the Bank of Canada is to maintain currency 
stability in order to promote international trade.  Applying the VAR model, 
he estimated the impulse-response function and variance decomposition for 
the call rate.  He showed that the Bank of Canada would raise the call rate 
in response to a depreciation of the Canadian dollar and that more variation 
in the call rate can be attributable to a shock to the output gap.   
Cargill (2001) reviewed the impact of the amended Bank of Korea Act in 
1997 that strengthened its independence, required setting an inflation target 
range, focused its efforts on price stability, and shifted its supervisory 
authority to a new agency.  Kim (2002) indicated that the optimal policy and 
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feedback horizons for inflation targeting are estimated to be 4-9 and 3-6 
quarterly, respectively.  Hence, the Bank of Korea needs to take preemptive 
actions ahead of the time in order to reduce the volatility of a shock.  Kim 
(2000) showed that the high interest rate policy in the 1997 as required by the 
IMF did not lead to the appreciation of the won.  Instead, the won 
depreciated.  Thus, he maintained that the IMF policy may be ill-advised.  
Applying the FIGARCH model, Han (2003) found, among other things, that 
during the Asian financial crisis, the Bank of Korea’s interventions to defend 
the won was not effective and did not impact the excess return or risk 
premium.   
 
3. THE MODEL 
The simple Taylor rule in general form can be written as 
 
 FFR = f(ID, YD)                                          (1) 
where,  
 FFR = the federal funds rate, 
 YD = the output gap (Y –Y ),  
 ID= the inflation gap (π  –π ), 
 Y= actual output, 
 Y = potential output, 
 π = the actual inflation rate, and   
π = the target inflation rate. 
 
The simple Taylor rule can be extended to consider the exchange rate and 
stock market performance for Korea and expressed as 
 
R = f(YD, ID, ED, SD)                       (2) 
where, 
R= the call rate in Korea, 
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 ED= deviation of the exchange rate from the trend, and 
 SD= deviation of stock prices from the trend. 
To consider potential simultaneous relationships and avoid simultaneity, 
equation (2) can be expressed by the VAR model  
 
Et = β1Et-1 + … + βmE t-m + θ Xt + ε t                                  (3) 
where, 
E= a vector of the endogenous variables [R, ID, YD, ED, SD],   
X = a vector of the exogenous variables [FFR, DUM], 
β and θ = parameter matrices, and 
ε = white noise error term. 
DUM = a dummy variable (1997.Q4 – 1998.Q3) for the Asian 
financial crisis. 
 
According to the Taylor rule, the call rate is expected to react positively to 
a shock to the inflation gap or the output gap.  In its Objectives of Monetary 
Policy, the Bank of Korea stated that it “takes price stability as the most 
important objective of its monetary policy” for a sustainable economic 
growth.  We also anticipate that the response of R to ED would be positive.  
In its Objectives of Monetary Policy, the Bank of Korea stated clearly: 
“Financial stability has become another important objective of monetary 
policy…Financial instability can trigger serious economic crises.” When the 
Korean won depreciates beyond the level that the Bank of Korea can tolerate, 
it would raise the call rate to strengthen the won so that it would not lead to 
domestic inflation.   
Following Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Rigobon and Sack (2003), the 
stock price is included in the VAR model to test whether the Bank of Korea 
may use its interest rate policy to maintain a healthy stock market.  In the 
monetary transmission mechanism (Mishkin, 1995), the stock market plays 
an important role as higher stock prices would cause households to spend 
more via the wealth effect and firms to invest more via Tobin’s q theory or 
the balance-sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
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These variables may affect each other.  The call rate is expected to be 
influenced by the output gap, the inflation gap, the exchange rate gap, and the 
stock price gap.  After the Bank of Korea reduces the benchmark call rate, 
banks would follow suit to reduce short- term interest rates.  The lower rate 
would cause household consumption and business investment spending to 
rise, shift the aggregate demand curve upward, and result in a higher GDP, 
which, in turn, would cause the output gap to rise.  When the GDP increases, 
the unemployment rate would decline and the inflation rate would rise, 
causing the inflation gap to increase.  It may be possible that an increase in 
the exchange rate gap would have a direct effect on the inflation gap and that 
an increase in the stock price gap would impact the output gap positively.  
Because we apply the VAR in empirical work and because all the 
endogenous variables are the same and have lag values, the simultaneity 
problem is not a concern and OLS yields efficient and consistent estimates.   
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The sample consists of quarterly data ranging from 1978.Q1 to 2003.Q2.  
Data for industrial share prices earlier than 1978.Q1 is not available.  All 
the data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics published 
by the International Monetary Fund.  R is call rate expressed as percent.  
The inflation rate is derived from the consumer price index and includes the 
current plus past three quarters.  The inflation gap is the difference between 
the average inflation rate and the target inflation rate of 2.0%.  Real GDP is 
expressed in billions of the won.  The nominal exchange rate is expressed as 
units of the won per U.S. dollar.  The industrial share price is used to 
represent the stock price index.  Trend values for real output, the exchange 
rate, and the stock index are estimated by the filtering process developed by 
Hodrick-Prescott (1997). 
The ADF test with an intercept in the equation is employed to determine 
whether each of the time series would have a unit root.  We find that ED and 
SD in levels are stationary, ID, YD, and R in levels are not stationary, and ID, 
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Table 1  Vector Error Correction Model 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Sample: 1978:1 2003:2 
 Included observations: 102 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1   
R(-1)  1.000000   
ID(-1) -0.942474   
  (0.23559)   
 [-4.00048]   
YD(-1)  0.217235   
  (0.51466)   
 [ 0.42209]   
C -7.351479   
Error Correction: D(R) D(ID) D(YD) 
CointEq1 -0.068462  0.081752  0.015929 
  (0.05126)  (0.05064)  (0.03491) 
 [-1.33547] [ 1.61449] [ 0.45625] 
D(R(-1))  0.290136  0.132976  0.023015 
  (0.10302)  (0.10176)  (0.07016) 
 [ 2.81625] [ 1.30675] [ 0.32803] 
D(R(-2)) -0.259093  0.047067  0.076145 
  (0.10607)  (0.10477)  (0.07224) 
 [-2.44258] [ 0.44922] [ 1.05408] 
D(ID(-1)) -0.097764  0.050578  0.097790 
  (0.11031)  (0.10896)  (0.07513) 
 [-0.88624] [ 0.46418] [ 1.30169] 
D(ID(-2)) -0.049160  0.138076  0.068995 
  (0.10783)  (0.10651)  (0.07343) 
 [-0.45592] [ 1.29641] [ 0.93957] 
D(YD(-1))  0.406084  0.202181 -0.322789 
  (0.15048)  (0.14864)  (0.10248) 
 [ 2.69860] [ 1.36024] [-3.14980] 
D(YD(-2))  0.316857  0.093254 -0.201953 
  (0.15322)  (0.15134)  (0.10434) 
 [ 2.06801] [ 0.61618] [-1.93545] 
C -0.150642 -0.034983  0.056473 
  (0.16928)  (0.16721)  (0.11528) 
 [-0.88990] [-0.20922] [ 0.48987] 
 R-squared  0.219801  0.144449  0.136792 
 Adj. R-squared  0.161701  0.080738  0.072510 
 Sum sq. resids  271.5618  264.9501  125.9468 
 S.E. equation  1.699693  1.678874  1.157523 
 F-statistic  3.783145  2.267243  2.128012 
 Log likelihood -194.6718 -193.4147 -155.4869 
 Akaike AIC  3.973957  3.949308  3.205626 
 Schwarz SC  4.179837  4.155189  3.411507 
 Mean dependent -0.134314 -0.067265  0.022922 
 S.D. dependent  1.856397  1.751049  1.201919 
 Determinant Residual Covariance      8.624029   
 Log Likelihood                    -531.5806   
Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)        -544.0774   
 Akaike Information Criteria           11.19760   
 Schwarz Criteria                    11.89244   
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YD, ED, SD and R in difference are stationary.1) The Johansen cointegration 
test including R, ID and YD and excluding ED and SD is performed.  The 
trace statistic is estimated to be 53.25 compared with the critical value of 
48.45 at the 1% level.  Hence, we find that R, ID, and YD have a long-term 
stable relationship.  For the nonstationary variables that are cointegrated 
(Hayashi, 2000), a VECM is estimated and presented in Table 1. 
Based on the Akaike, Schwarz and other information criteria and the level 
form, a lag length of 5 for the VAR model is chosen.2) Thus, the actual 
sample runs from 1979.Q2 to 2003.Q2.  The regression for the call rate has 
an adjusted R2 of 0.924 and the F test statistic of 44.13.  Compared with the 
approximate critical value of 2.12 with 27 and 69 degrees of freedom at the 
1% level, the whole regression is significant.   
The impulse-response function for the call rate is presented in Figure 1.  
The response of the call rate to a shock to the inflation gap, the output gap, 
the exchange rate gap, the stock market gap, or the lagged call rate is positive 
and significant during some of the periods.  There are several comments on 
the results.  Generally speaking, the Bank of Korea’s reaction function 
follows the simple Taylor rule that a central bank would raise the interest rate 
in response to an increase in the inflation gap or the output gap.  
Furthermore, the Bank of Korea would also take actions if the exchange rate 
deviates from its trend.  If currency depreciation is greater than what the 
central bank would expect, the Bank of Korea would intervene in the foreign 
exchange market by raising the call rate, and vice versa.  The Bank of Korea 
also monitors the stock market performance.  If the stock market  
                                            
1) A different trending method with a linear trend and the intercept included in the test 
equation and the GLS-ADF test were employed to test unit roots. The results show that ID 
and YD are nonstationary at the 5% level. 
2) We ran the VAR in first difference and find that within a 95% confidence interval, the call 
rate does not respond to the inflation gap and the stock price gap significantly and that it 
reacts positively to the output gap and negatively to the exchange rate gap. The insignificant 
response of the call rate to the inflation gap and the negative response of the call rate to the 
exchange rate gap seem to be inconsistent with the BOK’s monetary policy. Hamilton 
(1994) indicated that the level form would be acceptable in running VARs because 
differencing may throw away valuable information and does not yield asymptotic efficiency 
in an autoregressive time series 
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Figure 1  Impulse Response Function of the Call Rate 
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Table 2  Impulse Response Function of the Call Rate 
 
Period ID YD ED SD R 
 1  0.455641  0.060456  0.584179 -0.140827  1.122541 
  (0.13350)  (0.12935)  (0.12229)  (0.11442)  (0.08059) 
 2  0.441463  0.103313  0.432849 -0.037464  0.847930 
  (0.17302)  (0.12322)  (0.15044)  (0.17743)  (0.16885) 
 3  0.245786  0.287001 -0.295443  0.352401  0.568674 
  (0.20288)  (0.13485)  (0.16691)  (0.19875)  (0.19478) 
 4  0.317277  0.282426 -0.286871  0.672325  0.358527 
  (0.24255)  (0.14778)  (0.16083)  (0.21552)  (0.19380) 
 5  0.327320  0.209117  0.191765  0.483721  0.338275 
  (0.27585)  (0.14650)  (0.18090)  (0.22808)  (0.20838) 
 6  0.221417  0.343562  0.065816  0.286938  0.428366 
  (0.28746)  (0.14533)  (0.18169)  (0.23342)  (0.18206) 
 7  0.102019  0.458315 -0.162642  0.521128  0.525636 
  (0.31165)  (0.16195)  (0.19445)  (0.24982)  (0.17646) 
 8 -0.004569  0.443490 -0.053866  0.647785  0.520150 
  (0.33101)  (0.17289)  (0.18866)  (0.26352)  (0.17748) 
 9 -0.019651  0.402620  0.093232  0.535852  0.492820 
  (0.34926)  (0.17973)  (0.19294)  (0.27470)  (0.18479) 
 10 -0.107522  0.424785  0.040770  0.520890  0.443687 
  (0.37497)  (0.18782)  (0.18464)  (0.27940)  (0.19574) 
 11 -0.200447  0.419279 -0.026163  0.605834  0.417406 
  (0.39280)  (0.19874)  (0.18690)  (0.27717)  (0.20753) 
 12 -0.172877  0.370958  0.034412  0.568455  0.455611 
  (0.41097)  (0.20886)  (0.19002)  (0.28098)  (0.21365) 
Note: Cholesky Ordering: ID YD ED SD R. 
 
performance is below its trend, the Bank of Korea would drop the call rate to 
make the credit available and reduce the cost of borrowing.  Table 2 reports 
the impulse-response function for the call rate with numerical values. 
The variance decomposition for the call rate is presented in Table 3.  
Each value represents the proportion of the variance of the call rate that can 
be explained by the variable in that column.  As shown in the table, within  
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Table 3  Variance Decomposition of the Call Rate 
 
Period S.E. ID YD ED SD R 
 1  1.287480  11.32950  0.199454  18.62334  1.082275  68.76543 
 2  1.933572  13.66359  0.486412  17.94518  0.720893  67.18393 
 3  2.426309  12.77548  2.668700  16.99807  4.013408  63.54434 
 4  3.073344  12.61722  3.950628  15.63135  13.37548  54.42532 
 5  3.374264  13.40684  4.401425  14.69148  16.61940  50.88086 
 6  3.595753  13.23051  6.217435  13.59033  16.79715  50.16458 
 7  3.768123  11.71088  8.793919  12.28217  19.01173  48.20131 
 8  3.883745  10.24860  10.45629  10.78897  22.52720  45.97895 
 9  4.009896  9.335251  11.59080  9.933345  24.17788  44.96272 
 10  4.120590  8.743512  12.81292  9.178340  25.48927  43.77596 
 11  4.237787  8.461321  13.66396  8.433330  27.36960  42.07179 
 12  4.331688  8.166777  14.08673  7.852141  28.69407  41.20028 
Notes: 1) Cholesky Ordering: ID YD ED SD R. 
2) Standard Errors: Analytic. 
 
the 95% confidence interval, the lagged call rate is the most influential 
variable as it can explain up to 68.8% of the variation in the call rate. In the 
first year, the inflation gap and the exchange rate gap can explain up to 
11.3% and 18.6% of the variance, respectively.  In the long run, the stock 
market gap can explain up to 28.7% of the variation in the call rate.  The 
call rate reacts positively to the output gap, which can explain up to 13.7% of 
the variance. 
In its Objectives of Monetary Policy, the BOK “takes price stability as the 
most important objective of its monetary policy” for a sustainable economic 
growth and states that “financial stability has become another important 
objective of monetary policy.” In the original Taylor rule, the ordering is ID 
and YD.  Considering the views that a large depreciation of the won may 
cause domestic inflation and that stock prices are difficult to predict in the 
short run, the ordering of ID, YD, ED, and SD should be appropriate.  To 
check the robustness of empirical results, we change the ordering of the 
endogenous variables from ID, YD, ED, SD, R to YD, ID, ED, SD, and R.  
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The results are similar.  To save space, the graph and tables will be available 
upon request and are not printed here.   
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have investigated the Bank of Korea’s monetary policy 
reaction function.  We extend the simple Taylor rule by including the 
exchange rate gap, the stock price gap, and the lagged call rate.  The VAR 
model is employed in empirical work.  Major findings are summarized as 
follows.  The call rate reacts positively to a shock to the inflation gap, the 
output gap, the exchange rate gap, the stock market gap, or the lagged call 
rate in some of the periods.  Except for the lagged call rate, the inflation gap 
and the exchange rate gap are more influential in the short run whereas the 
output gap and the stock price gap are more influential in the long run.  
There are several policy implications.  First, the concept of the Taylor rule 
can be applied to the case of Korea as the call rate is positively associated 
with the inflation gap and the output gap.  The extended Taylor rule 
including the exchange rate gap, the stock price gap, and the lagged call rate 
is a better model because it captures how a small open economy attempts to 
stabilize the exchange rate and the equity market.  It would be appropriate 
for the Bank of Korea to set up priorities when conflicting goals are involved.  
For example, raising the interest rate to defend the won exchange rate may be 
in conflict with stimulating investment spending, and lowering the interest 
rate to devaluate the won to encourage exports may cause import prices and 
domestic inflation to rise.  
Future research may consider the following areas.  The inflation gap and 
the output gap did not explain as much variation in the call rate as we had 
expected.  It may be possible to reconstruct these two variables differently.  
Other monetary policy tools such as the monetary base and the discount rate 
may be considered in empirical work.  The conventional single-equation 
model may be considered to compare with the VAR model.  
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